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Abstract
The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation af-
fects the incentives of ﬁrms to invest, and to disclose information
about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider eﬀect
in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar
business-stealing eﬀect. Moreover, it aﬀects the disclosure incen-
tives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers
(e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but
either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermedi-
ate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability
and strategic disclosure for the ﬁrms’ proﬁts and the probability of
innovation.
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Firms that invest in research and development (R&D) manage their rivals’ beliefs by
revealing and concealing intermediate information. Innovative ﬁrms employ a variety
of strategies to inform the market about their capability to develop new technolo-
gies. In some industries ﬁrms make announcements about their upcoming innovations.
Firms reveal intermediate successes, give predictions about the date at which the new
product will be launched, or make other announcements related to their capability of
producing an innovation. Announcements by biotechnology and software ﬁrms about
intermediate successes are common practice. In other industries ﬁrms work in com-
plete secrecy. Many e-commerce ﬁrms go in so-called “stealth mode” to work on new
products. The ﬁrms do not make any announcements about their innovative capa-
bilities or upcoming products until the innovation is made. This paper attempts to
explain these information revelation strategies. In particular, I study the role that
the appropriability of an innovator’s revenue plays in explaining which information
revelation strategy a ﬁrm uses.
In this paper I analyze incentives for the strategic disclosure of a ﬁrm’s cost of
investment. An important feature of the model is that ﬁrms apply similar R&D tech-
nologies to obtain their innovation, i.e., the ﬁrms’ costs of investment are (perfectly)
positively correlated. The release of good news by one ﬁrm makes its rivals more
optimistic about their own opportunities in the R&D competition, which gives them
a greater incentive to invest. Illustrations of this eﬀe c tc a nb ef o u n di nt h er a c e s
for cold superconductivity and biotechnology.1 A second feature of the model is that
information revealed by ﬁrms is veriﬁable. Firms disclose their information through,
e.g., scientiﬁc journals or presentations in scientiﬁc conferences and trade shows.2
The incentive to invest in R&D is determined by the trade-oﬀ between two eﬀects.
On the one hand, there is the well-known business-stealing eﬀect. If ﬁrms compete
for an innovation where the winner takes all, and R&D investments are strategic
substitutes, then each ﬁrm has an incentive to overinvest in R&D. On the other hand,
t h e r ei saf r e e - r i d e re ﬀect if the winner of a R&D competition cannot appropriate the
1Choi (1991) gives an example of the 1986 breakthrough in cold superconductivity by IBM. IBM’s
intermediate success made other ﬁrms more optimistic about the feasibility of cold superconductivity,
and increased the investment intensity in the race for cold superconductivity. In the biotechnology
industry, Austen (1993) observes that an intermediate success by one biotechnology ﬁrm leads to an
increase in valuation of other ﬁrms in the industry.
2For example, in the race for cold superconductivity the IBM researchers published their break-
through in a scientiﬁc journal (Choi, 1991). In other instances, the information transmitted by ﬁrms
may not be veriﬁable. Section 6 brieﬂy discusses the incentives to misrepresent cost information.
1full revenue of his innovation, since part of the innovation’s revenue spills over to the
loser.3 The free-rider eﬀect reduces the incentives to invest in R&D. For example,
ﬁrms underinvest in R&D, if intellectual property rights are absent, and the winner
and loser of the R&D competition obtain an equal share of the innovation’s revenue.
A reduction of appropriability initially increases the expected proﬁts, since free-riding
reduces R&D overinvestments, but subsequently it decreases expected proﬁts, since
it turns overinvestments into underinvestments. Free-riding makes it less likely that
an innovation emerges.
The business-stealing eﬀect and the free-rider eﬀect also give conﬂicting incen-
tives to strategically disclose information about the cost of investment. First, if the
business-stealing eﬀect dominates, then a ﬁrm has an incentive to discourage its rival
from investing. Therefore, a ﬁrm has an incentive to withhold good news and disclose
only bad news about the cost of investment. A skeptical rival infers that a concealing
ﬁrm received good news. The rival’s perfect inference eliminates the ﬁrm’s incentive
to conceal information, and full disclosure emerges in equilibrium. Second, if the
free-rider eﬀect dominates, then the disclosure incentive is reversed. A ﬁrm discloses
good news and conceals bad news to encourage investments by its rival, and free-ride
on the revenue generated by them. Now a rival with skeptical beliefs infers that a
concealing ﬁrm has bad news, and again full disclosure results. In short, for extreme
protection parameters the “unraveling result” emerges (Grossman, 1981, Milgrom,
1981, and Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990).
Whereas the disclosure incentives are clear for extreme appropriability values (i.e.,
values corresponding to full protection or no protection of intellectual property rights),
there is a more subtle trade-oﬀ between the two eﬀects for intermediate spillover
values. In those cases countervailing incentives emerge (e.g., Lewis and Sappington,
1989). For a ﬁrm with good news the business-stealing eﬀect dominates, which gives
this ﬁrm the incentive to discourage its rival by concealing the good news. Conversely,
for a ﬁrm with bad news the free-rider eﬀect dominates, which gives such a ﬁrm an
incentive to encourage its rival by concealing the bad news. That is, for intermediate
spillover values both ﬁrm types have an incentive to conceal information, and can
therefore do so in a credible way.
Information disclosure aﬀects diﬀerent ﬁrms in diﬀerent ways. A receiver of infor-
mation earns on average a higher proﬁt after disclosure, since the information enables
3In practice, it is not feasible or desirable to protect an innovation perfectly from imitation (e.g.,
see Denicolò, 1996). In such cases the “winner-take-all” prize structure does not emerge.
2him to adjust his investment to the actual cost of investment. By contrast, a sender
prefers to precommit to secrecy, since this avoids investment adjustments by the re-
ceiver, and keeps the correlation between the ﬁrms’ investments low.4
The fact that the disclosure strategy changes in the spillover size has implications
for the proﬁts of ﬁrms and the probability of innovation. A spillover change may
also aﬀect the investments and proﬁts indirectly through changes in the disclosure
strategy and beliefs. This indirect eﬀect is absent in, e.g., De Fraja (1993), Denicolò
(1996), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Kamien and Zang (2000), Moldovanu and Sela
(2001), Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003), and Fosfuri and Rønde (2004), who analyze
the eﬀects of spillovers in settings with complete information.
T h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect reinforces the direct eﬀect for a sender. That is, both the
investment incentives and disclosure incentives are optimal for intermediate degrees
of appropriability, while they are both suboptimal otherwise. By contrast, for an
information receiver, the indirect eﬀect conﬂicts the direct eﬀect. The investment
incentives are optimal, while the disclosure incentives are suboptimal for intermediate
appropriability values, and vice versa for extreme values. In that case, strategic
disclosure may reverse the eﬀect of knowledge appropriability on the receiver’s proﬁt.
A similar trade-oﬀ emerges in the analysis of the probability of innovation.
There exists some literature on the eﬀects of asymmetric information and infor-
mation disclosure among innovative ﬁrms, e.g., see Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983),
Bhattacharya et al. (1990, 1992), d’Aspremont et al. (1998, 2000), Rosenkranz (2001),
Anton and Yao (2003, 2004), Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), and Gill (2008). How-
ever, in these papers the free-rider eﬀect is absent. Information is substantive in these
papers, in the sense that disclosure directly improves the receiver’s productivity.5 By
contrast, in the present paper ﬁrms choose disclosure strategies exclusively to aﬀect
the beliefs of a rival ﬁrm without any direct productivity eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium R&D investments and proﬁts for given disclosure rules.
Section 4 analyzes the disclosure incentives. Section 5 analyzes some implications, by
characterizing the overall expected proﬁts of the ﬁrms, and the probability of inno-
vation. Section 6 brieﬂy discusses some extensions to the basic model, and concludes
the paper. The proofs of the main results are relegated to the Appendix.
4For recent surveys on information sharing in oligopoly, see, e.g., Raith (1996), and Vives (1999).
5For example, a ﬁrm with an inferior technology can reduce its cost by signing a licensing contract
(Bhattacharya et al., 1990, 1992, d’Aspremont et al., 1998, 2000, and Bhattacharya and Guriev,
2006), or infringing an imperfect patent (Anton and Yao, 2003, 2004).
32T h e M o d e l
Consider two risk-neutral ﬁrms, ﬁrm R and S, that compete for an innovation. The
two ﬁrms have identical costs of investments, i.e., costs are perfectly positively cor-
related. Initially, ﬁrms do not know their investment cost parameter, θ.T h i s c o s t
parameter is either low, θ = θ, with probability p,o rh i g h ,θ = θ, with probability
1 − p,w h e r e0 ≤ θ < θ and 0 <p<1.F i r m S, the sender, learns the cost of
investment, while ﬁrm R, the receiver, does not learn.6
In stage 1 ﬁrm S chooses its disclosure rule. I assume that the cost information is
costlessly veriﬁable. Therefore, the only choice that the ﬁrm has, is to either truthfully
reveal its information or conceal it (i.e., send the uninformative message ∅). That
is, ﬁrm S chooses disclosure rule μ ≡ (μ(θ),μ(θ)),w h e r eμ(θ) is the probability with
which ﬁrm S discloses cost parameter θ,a n d1−μ(θ) is the probability with which it
conceals θ,w i t h0 ≤ μ(θ) ≤ 1 for θ ∈ {θ,θ}.F i r mR receives the realization of rule
μ, i.e., the message m ∈ {θ,∅},f r o mﬁrm S.
In stage 2, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose their R&D investments. If ﬁrm i spends
xi ∈ [0,1], its probability of obtaining an innovation is xi. In order to keep the model
manageable, I assume that ﬁrm i’s cost of investment is c(xi;θ)=θxi + 1
2λx2
i,f o r
θ ∈ {θ,θ} and i ∈ {R,S}.7 Parameter λ>0 yields decreasing returns to investment.
Ah i g h e rλ makes a ﬁrm’s marginal cost function steeper in the ﬁrm’s investment.
There are three possible outcomes for the ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst outcome, only one ﬁrm
develops the innovation. I assume that the loser of the R&D competition receives share
σ o ft h ew i n n e r ’ sp r i z eV . Hence, the winner receives (1−σ)V , while the loser receives
σV,w i t h0 ≤ σ ≤ 1
2.8 For σ =0 , a winner-take-all prize structure emerges, while for
σ = 1
2 ﬁrms share the prize equally. In the second outcome, both ﬁrms successfully
develop the innovation, and each receives prize V/2.9 In the third outcome, neither
ﬁrm obtains the innovation, and neither ﬁrm receives revenues. I impose the following
6Jansen (2004) analyzes the model where both ﬁrms receive imperfect cost signals. This model
of two-sided asymmetric information gives essentially the same economic insights.
7Jansen (2001) assumes the cost function c(xi;θ)=1
2θx2
i with θ ∈ {θ,θ}. This assumption gives
qualitatively similar results, and is equivalent to assuming that the ﬁr m sd on o tk n o wt h es i z eo f
prize V . The current cost structure is easier to analyze.
8A setting in which the total prize remains constant, and a ﬁxed share of the winner’s prize spills
over to the loser (i.e., no dissipation of rents) keeps the model tractable.
9In Jansen (2001) I adopt a more general prize structure, where each ﬁrm obtains prize T,w i t h
0 ≤ T ≤ 1
2V ,i fb o t hﬁrms are successful. The main qualitative results of the general model do not
diﬀer from those in the present paper.
4regularity condition to obtain interior solutions for ﬁrms’ R&D investments:
3θ − θ ≤ V< λ (2.1)
The second condition (λ>V )i ss u ﬃcient to make ﬁrms choose investment levels
below 1, while the additional condition (V ≥ 3θ − θ)i ss u ﬃcient for ﬁrms to choose
non-negative investment levels.
Given R&D investments x ≡ (xi,x j), ﬁrm i’s expected second-stage proﬁts are






















i + σVxj (2.2)
The model’s prize structure is such that the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are submodular in x.10
This yields a business-stealing motive. The positive spillover σ introduces free-rider
motives. The model captures situations where these two motives are present.
The model’s prize structure is consistent with the following examples of structural
form models. First, the prizes can emerge from R&D worker mobility in a model of
trade secrecy (e.g., Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2003, and Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004).
Suppose the innovation is an essential input for the production technologies of ﬁrms
R and S, i.e. no production is possible in the absence of the innovation. A ﬁrm’s
R&D worker moves to the ﬁrm’s rival with probability 2σ, and the worker stays with
the ﬁrm with probability 1 − 2σ.11 After a worker moves from a successful ﬁrm,
both ﬁrms have the innovation. If both ﬁrms have the innovation, then each ﬁrm
earns the duopoly proﬁt V/2, while if only one ﬁrm has the innovation, then it earns
the monopoly proﬁt V . Hence, if only one ﬁrm innovates, the winner’s and loser’s
expected prizes equal:
π
W =( 1 − 2σ)V +2 σ · V/2=( 1− σ)V ,a n d ( 2 . 3 )
π
L =( 1 − 2σ)0+2σ · V/2=σV, (2.4)
respectively. For example, if there is no risk of worker migration, the winner-take-all
payoﬀs emerge, and with certain labor migration the equal-sharing payoﬀsa p p l y .
10In this model with spillovers in the product market the investments are always strategic substi-
tutes. By contrast, in models with spillovers in the investment stage (e.g., Kamien and Zang, 2000)
the investments may become strategic complements for strong spillovers.
11For example, the ﬁrms can inﬂuence the risk by choosing the their locations (e.g., the distance
from each other, or the area’s enforcement of post-employment convenants to compete).
5Second, the prize structure can be generated by a model of probabilistic patents
(e.g., Anton and Yao, 2004). Again, suppose that the innovation is essential for
proﬁtable production by a ﬁrm. The goods are diﬀerentiated, and each product
generates a proﬁto fV/2. If only one ﬁrm innovates, it receives a patent which is
valid (invalid) with probability 1 − 2σ (resp. 2σ). If both ﬁrms are successful, the
patent is randomly assigned to one of the ﬁrms with equal probability. The holder of
a valid patent extracts the total industry proﬁt V (i.e., the proﬁti ni t so w nm a r k e t ,
V/2, and the rival’s proﬁt, V/2) through a ﬁxed licensing fee.12 An invalid patent
gives each ﬁrm the proﬁt from its own good, i.e., V/2. Hence, a winner’s and loser’s
expected prizes equal (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. For example, the winner-take-all
payoﬀs correspond to a patent with certain validity, while the equal-sharing payoﬀs
correspond to an invalid patent.13
I solve the game backwards, and focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria.
3 Equilibrium R&D
In this section I characterize the equilibrium R&D investments and proﬁts for any
exogenously given information disclosure rule (μ(θ),μ(θ)).
3.1 Investments
At the time that ﬁrms choose their R&D investments they have the following informa-
tion. Firm S received its cost information θ ∈ {θ,θ}, and it sent message m ∈ {θ,∅}
to its rival. The disclosure rule (μ(θ),μ(θ)) determines the probability with which
ﬁrm S sends the messages θ and θ, respectively. Given message m ﬁrm R assigns pos-
terior belief P(m) to having a low cost of investment (θ = θ), i.e., ﬁrm R’s posterior
12Notice that the goods R and S need to be suﬃciently weak substitutes. As long as the single-
product monopoly proﬁt is lower than the sum of duopoly proﬁts, a patent holder prefers to license
its technology to its rival against a ﬁxed fee. For example, identical Cournot duopolists with linear
inverse demand functions, Pi(qi,q j)=a−qi −bqj, have an incentive to license for all b<2(
√
2−1).
13Alternatively, the spillover can be related to the length of a valid patent, T (Denicolò, 1996). The
patent holder extracts the total industry proﬁt ﬂow during the patent life. After the patent expires,
each ﬁrm receives the proﬁt ﬂow from its own good. Using discount factor r,d e ﬁne σ ≡ 1
2e−rT,
and deﬁn et h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fa ne t e r n a lp r o ﬁt ﬂow from good i as V/2 for i ∈ {R,S}.T h e n
the present values of the winner’s and loser’s proﬁts are (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. For example,
the winner-take-all payoﬀs correspond to an inﬁnite patent length (i.e., limT→∞ σ =0 ), while the
equal-sharing payoﬀs correspond to a patent of zero length (i.e., limT→0 σ = 1
2).





1,i fm = θ,
0,i fm = θ,
p[1−μ(θ)]
1−E{μ(θ)},i fm = ∅.
(3.1)
Firm S receives good news and conceals it with probability p[1 − μ(θ)].T h e p r o b -
ability with which ﬁrm S conceals information is 1 − E{μ(θ)}. If the probability of
disclosing a good signal increases, it becomes more likely that a concealing ﬁrm has
a bad signal, and therefore ∂P(∅)/∂μ(θ) < 0. Naturally, a marginal increase in the
probability of disclosing a bad signal has the opposite eﬀect, i.e., ∂P(∅)/∂μ(θ) > 0.
Proﬁt maximization, given these beliefs, yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
λx
∗





S(θ;m)=( 1 − σ)V − θ − x
∗
R(m)V/2. (3.3)
Notice that a ﬁrm’s best response is decreasing in its rival’s expected investment, i.e.,
the ﬁrms’ investments are strategic substitutes. The equilibrium investments x∗
R(m)
and x∗
S(θ;m) are the solution to the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (3.2)-(3.3). Under
condition (2.1) the solution always exists and is unique (see, e.g., Vives, 1999). The
properties of these investments are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For any exogenously given disclosure rule (μ(θ),μ(θ)),t h ee q u i l i b r i u m
R&D incentives are such that: (a) investments are decreasing in the spillover σ;
(b) ﬁrm R’s investments are ranked as x∗
R(θ) ≥ x∗
R(∅) ≥ x∗
R(θ),a n dﬁrm S’s invest-




S(θ;∅); (c) the investment
of ﬁrm R (S) with an uninformative message is non-increasing (non-decreasing) in
disclosure probability μ(θ);ar e d u c t i o no fμ(θ) has similar eﬀects; (d) the ex ante
expected investment is independent of the disclosure rule, and identical for both ﬁrms.
One immediate observation from the inspection of (3.2) and (3.3) is that an in-
crease of the spillover σ shifts both ﬁrms’ best response curves inward. A greater
spillover yields greater free-rider incentives. Consequently, a ﬁrm’s equilibrium R&D
investment is decreasing in the spillover, i.e., ∂x∗
i/∂σ < 0 for i ∈ {R,S}.
Firm R’s investment incentive depends as follows on the ﬁrm’s beliefs. On the one
hand, a ﬁrm with a higher posterior probability P(m) is more optimistic about its
costs of investment. But, on the other hand, a ﬁrm with a high posterior probability
P(m) expects ﬁercer competition than a ﬁrm with a lower posterior belief. Since the
7direct cost eﬀect outweighs the indirect competition eﬀect, a more optimistic ﬁrm
invests more than a pessimistic ﬁrm, i.e., x∗
R(θ) ≤ x∗
R(∅) ≤ x∗
R(θ),a ss t a t e di np a r t
(b) of the lemma. Moreover, the equilibrium investment of ﬁrm R with message ∅ is
increasing in posterior probability P(∅), i.e., ∂x∗
R(∅)/∂P(∅) > 0.14
Firm S chooses the best response strategy to ﬁrm R’s investment levels. Anal-
ogous to the observation on ﬁrm R’s investment incentives, ﬁrm S with good news
has a greater incentive to invest in R&D than ﬁrm S with bad news, i.e., x∗
S(θ;m) >
x∗
S(θ;m0) for any feasible messages m and m0.T h ee ﬀect of disclosure on the invest-
ment incentive of ﬁrm S depends on the eﬀect of disclosure on ﬁrm R’s beliefs. Firm
R is more pessimistic about the cost of investment after concealment of good news,
and invests less, than after disclosure. Consequently, ﬁrm S has a greater incentive
to invest, i.e., x∗
S(θ;∅) ≥ x∗
S(θ;θ). Analogous arguments give: x∗
S(θ;θ) ≥ x∗
S(θ;∅).
A marginal change of the posterior belief P(∅) has similar eﬀects on the investment
incentives of a concealing ﬁrm S.
Finally, the ex ante expected equilibrium investments of ﬁrms R and S for disclo-
sure strategy μ are deﬁned as follows:
X
∗




S(μ;σ) ≡ EθEm(θ) {x
∗
S(θ;m(θ))},








The ex ante expected equilibrium investment is independent of the disclosure rule,
i.e., X∗
i (μ;σ)= b X(σ) for any μ and i ∈ {R,S},w i t h :
b X(σ) ≡
(1 − σ)V − E(θ)
λ + V/2
. (3.4)
This results from the linearity of the equilibrium investments in cost parameter θ.15
14Combining this fact with the earlier observations that posterior belief P(∅) decreases (increases)
in the disclosure probability μ(θ) (respectively, μ(θ)), gives part (c) of the lemma.
15On the one hand, an increase of μ(θ) makes it more likely that ﬁrm R invests x∗
R(θ) instead of
x∗
R(∅). On the other hand, an increase in μ(θ) changes ﬁrm R’s investment x∗
R(∅) indirectly through
its beliefs. The direct eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the indirect eﬀect. A similar trade-oﬀ emerges for ﬁrm S.
By contrast, in Jansen (2001), where equilibrium investments are non-linear functions of parameter
θ,t h eex ante expected investment under full concealment is smaller than the expected investment
under full disclosure.
83.2 Proﬁts
In this subsection I study the ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts for a given disclosure rule.
The ex ante expected proﬁto fﬁrm i is deﬁned as follows (for i ∈ {R,S}):
Π
∗
i(μ;σ) ≡ EθEm(θ) {πi(x
∗(m);θ,σ)}. (3.5)
The eﬀect of an increase in the spillover is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For any exogenously given disclosure rule μ and i ∈ {R,S},t h e
ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁt Π∗
i(μ;σ) is single-peaked in spillover σ,a n di s
maximized for spillover b σ, with 0 < b σ<1
2.
The marginal eﬀect of a spillover change on the ex ante expected proﬁts can be

















The ﬁrst term represents an indirect eﬀect. I showed in Lemma 1 (a) that equilib-
rium investments are decreasing in the spillover, i.e., ∂x∗
j/∂σ < 0.T h ee ﬀect of the
reduction of the rival’s investment on ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁtd e p e n d so nt h es i z eo f











If the spillover is suﬃciently small, then ∂πi/∂xj < 0.I nt h a tc a s eﬁrm i is better oﬀ if
its rival’s investments are reduced, since the business-stealing eﬀect dominates. If the
ﬁrms share their revenues equally (σ = 1
2), then ∂πi/∂xj > 0.H e n c e ,f o ras u ﬃciently
large spillover, and given the own investment, ﬁrms would prefer to compete against
a rival with high investments, since the free-rider eﬀect is the dominant eﬀect here.
T h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect is therefore positive for a suﬃciently small spillover, and negative
for a suﬃciently big spillover.
T h el a s tt e r mi n( 3 . 6 )i st h ed i r e c te ﬀect of the spillover on ﬁrm i’s proﬁts. On the
one hand, expected proﬁts are reduced by VX ∗
i (μ;σ), since for each unit of a ﬁrm’s
own investment the appropriable revenue is lower. On the other hand, the expected
proﬁt is increased by the revenue that spills over from investments of the rival ﬁrm,
i.e., VX ∗
j(μ;σ). These two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other, since expected equilibrium
investments are symmetric (Lemma 1d). The direct eﬀect is therefore zero.
9Hence, the overall eﬀect is such that the equilibrium proﬁts are initially increasing,
and subsequently decreasing in the spillover. In particular, the spillover b σ ∈ (0, 1
2),
which maximizes the ﬁrms’ ex ante expected proﬁts, equals:
b σ =
V − E(θ)
2(λ + V )
, (3.8)
and yields a prize structure strictly between winner-take-all and equal-sharing.
4 Information Disclosure
So far I considered investments and proﬁts for an exogenously given disclosure rule.
This section analyzes the incentives to disclose information.
4.1 Precommitment to Disclose Information
The incentive to precommit to an information disclosure rule depends on the eﬀects




































An immediate implication of Lemma 1 (d) is that the ex ante expected spillover term
σVX∗
i (μ;σ) is independent of the disclosure rule for any ﬁrm i. Information disclosure
has the following eﬀects for the remaining terms of the expected proﬁt functions.
Proposition 2 For any given spillover σ, ﬁrm R prefers precommitment to full
disclosure, and ﬁrm S prefers precommitment to full concealment. In particular,
∂Π∗
R/∂μ(θ) > 0 and ∂Π∗
S/∂μ(θ) < 0 for any θ ∈ {θ,θ} and any σ.
First, an increase of the disclosure probability μ(θ) increases the likelihood that
ﬁrm R is able to adjust its investment level to the ﬁrm’s actual productivity. This
increases the average eﬃciency of ﬁrm R’s decisions, and increases the ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁt. Second, an increase of the disclosure probability, and subsequent investment
adjustments by ﬁrm R, increases the correlation between the ﬁrms’ investments. The
increased correlation between investment levels reduces the expected proﬁto fﬁrm S,
since investments are strategic substitutes. That is, whereas the expected proﬁto f
10ﬁrm R increases in the disclosure probability, the expected proﬁto fﬁrm S decreases
in disclosure. Consequently, if ﬁrm S can precommit to an information-sharing rule
before it learns information θ, then it will choose to conceal all information.
The eﬀects of disclosure are independent of the spillover parameter σ for the fol-
lowing reason. Disclosure strategies only aﬀect the variance of the ﬁrms’ investments,
not the mean (Lemma 1d). Conversely, the spillover only aﬀects the average invest-
ment level, since it creates a uniform downward shift of investments, and does not
aﬀect the variance. Consequently, the eﬀect of disclosure on expected proﬁts does not
depend on the size of spillover.
4.2 Strategic Information Disclosure
This subsection studies the incentives of ﬁrm S to share information after it received
information. Firm S anticipates the eﬀects of its disclosure rule on the beliefs of ﬁrm
R, and chooses the disclosure rule which maximizes its expected proﬁt. The propo-
sition below shows that for intermediate spillovers ﬁrm S discloses its information
only partially or not at all. That is, the “unraveling result” of Okuno-Fujiwara et al.
(1990) breaks down for these spillover values.16
Proposition 3 The values σk and σk, and continuous functions μk :[ σk,σk] → [0,1]
exist for k ∈ {L,H},w h e r e0 <σ L < σL < b σ<σ H < σH < 1
2, μL is decreasing, with
μL(σL)=1and μL(σL)=0 ,a n dμH is increasing, with μH(σH)=0and μH(σH)=1 ,
such that ﬁrm S chooses the following disclosure rule in the unique equilibrium:17
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The disclosure probabilities μL(σ) and μH(σ) are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
For low spillovers, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is decreasing in the rival’s investment level, and
consequently ﬁrm S has an incentive to disclose only bad news. Firm R anticipates
16An important condition for unraveling, which is not satisﬁed here, is monotonicity of ﬁrm S’s
proﬁt in the rival’s strategy. The change in sign of ∂πS/∂xR for an intermediate spillover plays an
important role for ﬁrm S’s information disclosure incentives.









=( 1 ,q) are equilibrium disclosure rules for any
q ∈ [0,1] in (a) and (e), respectively. But these disclosure rules transmit the same amount of
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Figure 1: Equilibrium disclosure strategy
this and infers that the concealing ﬁrm received low cost information. This eliminates
ﬁrm S’s possibilities to eﬀectively conceal information. For a suﬃciently high spillover
the reverse holds, i.e., proﬁts are increasing in the rival’s investment level, which gives
ﬁrm S an incentive to disclose only good news. But the disclosure equilibrium is
the same as for low spillovers, i.e., full disclosure with skeptical beliefs. This is the
unraveling result, as obtained by, e.g., Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
For intermediate spillovers the intuition is more subtle. As is clear from expression
(3.7), the sign of ∂πS/∂xR depends not only on the spillover size, but also on ﬁrm
S’s investment xS. As was observed in lemma 1 (b), a ﬁrm with good news invests
more than a ﬁrm with bad news. Therefore, given beliefs, a region of intermediate
spillover values exists where the following holds. On the one hand, ﬁrm S’s proﬁti s
decreasing in ﬁrm R’s investment, if ﬁrm S received good news. But, on the other
hand, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is increasing in its rival’s investment if the ﬁrm received bad
news. In other words, the ﬁrm has countervailing incentives for intermediate spillover
values (Lewis and Sappington, 1989). This gives both a ﬁrm with good news and a
ﬁrm with bad news an incentive to conceal information. The ﬁrm with good news
conceals to discourage investments by its rival (since the ﬁrm’s proﬁti sd e c r e a s i n g
in the rival’s investment). But the ﬁrm with bad news has an incentive to conceal,
because it would like to encourage investments by its rival (since the ﬁrm’s proﬁti s
increasing in its rival’s investment). Since both types of ﬁrm S have an incentive to
conceal its cost information, it can credibly do so. This explains that, for intermediate
spillover values, ﬁrm S fully conceals the cost in equilibrium.18
18Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) obtain a related non-disclosure result for a common value model
of oil exploration. This result is notably diﬀerent from those of, e.g., Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983),
12Partial disclosure emerges as the equilibrium disclosure rule for the remaining
spillover values. These spillover values are such that ﬁrm S of one type (e.g., θ)
prefers to conceal, whereas the other type (e.g., θ) is indiﬀerent between disclosure
and concealment, given rival’s beliefs consistent with such a partial disclosure rule.19
The comparison of Propositions 2 and 3 highlights the contrast between the ex
ante and ex post incentives of ﬁrms to disclose information. The next section argues
that this diﬀerence in disclosure incentives has some interesting implications.
5I m p l i c a t i o n s
After characterizing the equilibrium strategies, I now analyze the consequences for
the equilibrium proﬁts, and the probability of innovation.
5.1 Eﬀects on Proﬁts
How does a ﬁrm’s ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁt depend on the spillover? The
overall eﬀect of a marginal change in the spillover σ on the expected equilibrium proﬁt
is as follows (for Π∗
R and Π∗


















This expression embodies a trade-oﬀ between two eﬀects. On the one hand, an increase
of the spillover has a direct eﬀect on the expected equilibrium proﬁt (Proposition
1). This direct eﬀect is captured by the second term of (5.1). On the other hand,
a marginal increase of the spillover may also have an indirect eﬀect on the expected
equilibrium proﬁt, as is captured by the ﬁrst term of (5.1). An increase of the spillover
may change the equilibrium probability of information disclosure (Proposition 3),
w h i c hi nt u r nc h a n g e saﬁrm’s expected proﬁt (Proposition 2).
For the spillover values in the intervals [0,σL], [σL,σH],a n d[σH, 1
2], only the direct
eﬀect emerges, since for these spillover values the equilibrium disclosure rule does not
change with σ as Proposition 3 shows. Therefore, the result of Proposition 1 is directly
applicable, and the equilibrium proﬁts reach a local maximum in b σ on the interval
[σL,σH],w h e r eﬁrm S conceals all information.
d’Aspremont et al (1998, 2000), and Anton and Yao (2003, 2004), who focus on separating equilibria.
19Proposition 3 could explain the disclosure of intermediate success by IBM, as reported in Choi
(1991). Cold superconductivity is a basic innovation, which can have several applications. Hence, the
innovation by one ﬁrm may be a source of considerable revenues for rivals. As shown, for suﬃciently
high spillover values, ﬁrm S indeed has an incentive to disclose good news with a positive probability.
13For the remaining spillover values, i.e., for spillovers in the intervals (σL,σL) and
(σH,σH), both the direct and indirect eﬀects play a role, since for these values the
equilibrium disclosure rule changes in the spillover. The trade-oﬀ between these two
eﬀects is diﬀerent for the two ﬁrms, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4 (a) Firm S’s expected equilibrium proﬁt is single-peaked in σ,a n d
is maximized for spillover b σ; (b) Firm R’s expected equilibrium proﬁt has three local
maxima: each interval [σL,σL) and (σH,σH],a sd e ﬁned in proposition 3, contains
one local maximum, and the third local maximum is reached for σ = b σ,w i t hb σ as
deﬁned in (3.8).
For ﬁrm S t h ed i r e c ta n di n d i r e c te ﬀects reinforce each other. The equilibrium




















Figure 2: Equilibrium Proﬁto fF i r mS
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt under full concealment (full disclosure). The bold line sketches the
expected proﬁt for the equilibrium disclosure rule. Firm S expects the highest proﬁt
from full concealment (see Proposition 2). For extreme spillover values (i.e., σ<
σL or σ>σ H), neither the investment incentives nor the information revelation
incentives yield optimal expected proﬁts for ﬁrm S. But for intermediate spillover
values (i.e., σL <σ<σ H) both R&D incentives (Proposition 1) and disclosure
incentives (Proposition 3c) yield the highest expected proﬁts, and expected proﬁts
reach a global maximum, as Figure 2 illustrates. Therefore, strategic disclosure has
no eﬀect on the choice of the spillover which maximizes the expected proﬁto fﬁrm
S. However, strategic disclosure does aﬀect the proﬁt locally. In particular, on the
interval (σL,σL) (resp. (σH,σH)) the proﬁt increases (decreases) more steeply in the
spillover than in the absence of strategic disclosure.
14For ﬁrm R the direct eﬀect and indirect eﬀects are in conﬂict. Figure 3 illus-



















Figure 3: Equilibrium Proﬁto fF i r mR
the expected proﬁt under full disclosure (full concealment). The bold line sketches
the expected proﬁt for the equilibrium disclosure rule. Firm R would earn the highest
expected proﬁts if all information were disclosed (Proposition 2). The ﬁrm can obtain
this level of expected proﬁt only for extreme spillover values (Proposition 3). However,
for these spillover values the ﬁrms have sub-optimal investment incentives (Proposi-
tion 1). Conversely, for intermediate spillovers the strategic disclosure incentives are
such that only sub-optimal expected proﬁt levels can be reached, despite better in-
vestment incentives. As a consequence of this trade-oﬀ between investment incentives
and disclosure incentives, two additional local maxima emerge. One emerges on the
interval [σL,σL], while the other emerges on [σH,σH], as Figure 3 illustrates.20
5.2 Eﬀects on Innovation Probability
Strategic disclosure may also have an eﬀect on the probability of obtaining an in-
novation. For a given disclosure rule, μ, the expected probability of innovation in
equilibrium equals:
I





This equilibrium probability has the following properties.
Proposition 5 (a) For any exogenously given disclosure rule, μ, the ex ante expected
probability of innovation I∗(μ;σ) is decreasing (and concave) in the spillover σ.
20The indirect eﬀect dominates at least for spillover values suﬃciently close to σL and σH.
15(b) For any spillover σ the ex ante expected probability of innovation is decreasing in
disclosure probability μ(θ) for any θ, i.e., ∂I∗(μ;σ)/∂μ(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ {θ,θ}.
First, the probability of innovation is decreasing in the spillover for any exoge-
nously given disclosure rule, since the equilibrium investments are decreasing in the
spillover. Second, disclosure has the following eﬀect on the probability of innovation.
The expected probability of innovation under full disclosure is the expected success
probability from investments by informed ﬁrms, i.e., E{1 − [1 − x∗
R(θ)]
2}.T h e e x -
pected probability under full concealment equals the success probability from expected
investments by informed ﬁrms, i.e., 1−[1 − E{x∗
R(θ)}]
2. The success probability from
expected investments exceeds the expected success probability from informed ﬁrms’
investments, since the success probability 1−(1−x)2 is concave in the investment x.
A marginal change of the spillover has the following overall eﬀect on the probability















As in the proﬁt analysis, a marginal spillover increase yields a trade-oﬀ between a
d i r e c ta n da ni n d i r e c te ﬀect. On the one hand, the spillover increase reduces the
probability of innovation, as is summarized by the second term of (5.3), which is neg-
ative. On the other hand, the spillover increase may aﬀect the equilibrium disclosure
rule (Proposition 3), and thereby indirectly change the probability of innovation, since
it is decreasing in the disclosure probability. This indirect eﬀect is represented by the
ﬁrst term of (5.3). The trade-oﬀ gives the following result.
Proposition 6 The expected probability of innovation in equilibrium, I∗(μ∗(σ);σ),
has at most two local maxima. The ﬁrst local maximum is reached for σ =0 ,i ta l w a y s
exists, and it is the unique global maximum. If a second local maximum exists, then
it is reached for some spillover σo in the interval (σL,σL],a sd e ﬁned in proposition
3. In particular, the critical value λ
o exists such that if λ>λ
o, then the second local
maximum exists, and is reached for σ = σL.
For all spillovers σ/ ∈ (σL,σL) the probability of innovation is decreasing in the
spillover, since the direct and indirect eﬀects are not in conﬂict. Figure 4 illustrates
the expected probability of innovation. The upper (lower) thin line represents the
expected success probability for full concealment (resp. full disclosure). The thick line















Figure 4: Probability of Innovation
disclosure makes the bold line steeper than any of the thin lines for σH <σ<σH,
since the indirect eﬀect reinforces the direct eﬀect on this interval.
For σ ∈ (σL,σL) the direct and indirect eﬀects are in conﬂict. On the one hand, the
probability of innovation would increase by a spillover reduction for any exogenously
given disclosure rule (the second term in 5.3 is always negative). On the other hand,
such a spillover reduction increases the disclosure probability μL (by Proposition 3),
which in turn reduces the probability of innovation (the ﬁrst term of 5.3 is positive).
If the marginal cost of investment is suﬃciently steep (i.e., λ is high), then the indirect
eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect. In this case, the probability of innovation increases
by reducing the appropriability of revenues from innovation. This is illustrated in
Figure 4, where the success probability reaches a local maximum for spillover value
σ = σL.
Although the probability of innovation may reach a local maximum for σ = σL,
the global maximum is unchanged. Perfect appropriability of revenues from innova-
tion (σ =0 ) gives the greatest investments in R&D, and the highest probability of
innovation (see the Supplementary Appendix).
6 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the eﬀects of some extensions on the paper’s main results.
6.1 Information Structure
The analysis of disclosure incentives in proposition 3 has also implications for the
incentives to reveal non-veriﬁable information. If signals are non-veriﬁable, then ﬁrm
17S may misrepresent them. In fact, it is intuitive and easy to show that ﬁrm S can
never credibly signal the productivity to ﬁrm R.
Proposition 7 If information θ is non-veriﬁable, then there only exist equilibria in
which ﬁrm S sends non-informative signals to ﬁrm R.
First, if ﬁrm R believes any message it receives, i.e., it has beliefs consistent with
truthful revelation, then ﬁrm S has an incentive to misrepresent its cost for any
spillover value. Firm S with good (bad) news has an incentive to misrepresent its
information, and thereby reduce (increase) the investment of a credulous rival, for
any σ<σH (respectively, σ>σ L). Since σL < σH, as shown in Proposition 3, there
is always a ﬁrm type with an incentive to deviate from truthful revelation. Similar
incentives are present for less extreme beliefs. Second, for any spillover there exists
an equilibrium in which no information is revealed.21 This is a standard result for
models with non-veriﬁable signals. Therefore, there only exist equilibria in which ﬁrm
S sends non-informative signals to ﬁrm R. This observation extends the result of Ziv
(1993) to a setting with spillovers between ﬁrms.
The basic model assumes that ﬁrm S receives a perfectly informative signal about
the ﬁrms’ R&D productivity. The introduction of some noise would alter the infor-
mation and beliefs of ﬁrms, since the ﬁrms now base their investment decisions on a
signal (and the message about the signal), which is positively correlated with θ.B u t
the basic intuition and qualitative results do not change (Jansen, 2004).
Alternatively, the signal of ﬁrm S can be imperfect, since the ﬁrm may fail to
receive information (Dye, 1985, and Farrell, 1986). Uncertainty about the informed-
ness of ﬁrm S has the following eﬀects on the R&D incentives, disclosure incentives,
and proﬁts. As before, ﬁrm S has an incentive to disclose bad (good) news while
concealing good (bad) news for suﬃciently low (high) spillover values. The crucial
diﬀerence with the previous analysis is that these disclosure strategies no longer result
in unraveling. Now it remains ambiguous whether ﬁrm S is informed and conceals
the information, or ﬁrm S is uninformed (Shin, 1994, and Jansen, 2008). Despite the
altered beliefs and failure of full unraveling, the basic trade-oﬀs in the analysis are
unchanged.
Finally, the model can be extended by introducing two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion without changing the qualitative results (Jansen, 2004).
21If ﬁrm R expects uninformative claims from its rival, it ignores these claims. Consequently, ﬁrm
S is indiﬀerent between truthful, untruthful, and uninformative claims.
186.2 Policy Conclusions
This paper treats the spillover σ as a parameter, and performs a comparative statics
analysis. In practice, however, ﬁrms or policy makers may be able to inﬂuence the
size of the spillover.
Firms may aﬀect the size of the spillover by adjusting their research design (Kat-
soulacos and Ulph, 1998, and Kamien and Zang, 2000) or location (Gersbach and
Schmutzler, 2003, and Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004). First, if the ﬁrms do not coordinate,
and they can adjust the spillover choice in the short term, then the individual proﬁts
are relevant. Section 3 shows that the ﬁrms’ interests are aligned if information is
exogenous (i.e., both ﬁrms prefer to move the spillover in the direction of b σ). However,
strategic information disclosure may create a conﬂict of interest between the sender
and receiver of information. For spillovers in the intervals [σL,σL] and [σH,σH] the
sender prefers to move the spillover towards b σ, whereas the receiver prefers to move
the spillover away from b σ, as section 5.1 shows.
Second, if ﬁrms coordinate the spillover choice, or if the choice is a long-term
commitment, then the industry proﬁt sm a yb em o r er e l e v a n t . 22 The analysis of the
industry proﬁts in equilibrium is analogous to the proﬁt analysis of the individual
ﬁrms. The eﬀect of information disclosure on the industry proﬁts depends on the size
of cost parameter λ, as Vives (1984) and Kirby (1988) show.
Proposition 8 Firms jointly prefer precommitment to full concealment (disclosure) if
λ<λ
∗ (respectively, λ>λ
∗)w h e r eλ
∗ ≡ (1+
√




0 if λ R λ
∗ for any θ ∈ {θ,θ}.
If λ is suﬃciently low (high), then the ﬁr m se x p e c t st h eh i g h e s tp r o ﬁtf r o maquid
pro quo agreement to conceal (disclose) all information.23 Consequently, if λ is low,
then the eﬀect of a spillover choice on the expected industry proﬁts corresponds to
the eﬀect on the sender’s expected proﬁt in section 5.1. Conversely, for high values of
λ the industry’s incentives to choose a spillover value correspond to the incentives of
the receiver in section 5.1.
22For example, each ﬁrm maximizes industry proﬁts in a model where the identity of the informed
ﬁrm (S) is determined randomly at the beginning of the game, and the ﬁrms choose the spillover
before their roles (i.e., receiver or sender) are determined. Alternatively, industry proﬁts are relevant
in a symmetric model with two-sided asymmetric information (Jansen, 2004).
23Clearly, if ﬁrms precommit to a disclosure rule non-cooperatively, then full information conceal-
ment is the dominant strategy, as follows from proposition 2.
19Proposition 9 The critical value λ
∗∗ exists, with λ
∗∗ >λ
∗ (and λ
∗ as deﬁned in
proposition 2), such that if λ ≤ λ
∗∗, then the expected industry proﬁts are single-peaked
in σ, as in Proposition 4 (a), while if λ>λ
∗∗, then the expected equilibrium industry
proﬁt has a similar shape as ﬁrm R’s expected equilibrium proﬁti nP r o p o s i t i o n4( b ) .
Ap o l i c ym a k e rm a ya ﬀect the size of the spillover by adjusting the strength of
intellectual property rights (Denicolò, 1996, and Anton and Yao, 2003, 2004). For a
policy maker, the probability of innovation may be important, since it may be related
to the economic growth rate, or the consumer surplus. In this case the spillover choice
follows from the analysis in section 5.2. A full welfare analysis would have to include
the eﬀects of rent dissipation. Unfortunately, such an analysis is less tractable, since
equilibrium investments become nonlinear functions of the degree of appropriability.
Such an analysis awaits future research.
A Appendix
In this Appendix I prove Lemma 1, and Propositions 1-9.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
The ﬁrst-order conditions (3.2) and (3.3) yield the following equilibrium R&D invest-




(1 − σ)V − E(θ|m)
λ + V/2









(a) Equilibrium investments are decreasing in σ,s i n c e∂x∗
R(m)/∂σ < 0 for any m.
















.( A . 4 )
The inequalities then follow immediately from the inequality θ ≤ E(θ|∅) ≤ θ.









.( A . 5 )














< 0.( A . 6 )





































.( A . 8 )
The signs of these expressions then follow immediately from θ ≤ E(θ|∅) ≤ θ.





R(θ)} +[ 1− E{μ(θ)}]x
∗







S(θ;∅)}.( A . 1 0 )
Substituting (A.1) in (A.9), and (A.2) in (A.10), gives X∗
i (μ;σ)= b X(σ) for all i. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1





=0for all i and σ. Expressions (A.1)
and (A.2) imply that ∂x∗
j/∂σ = −V/(λ + V/2) for all θ, m,a n dj ∈ {R,S}.U s i n g


























.( A . 1 1 )
Clearly, ∂Π∗
i/∂σ is linear in σ,w i t h∂Π∗
i(μ;0)/∂σ > 0 >∂ Π∗
i(μ; 1
2)/∂σ,a n di ti s
independent of i. Hence, Π∗
i is single-peaked in σ,a n dt h eu n i q u es p i l l o v e rb σ ∈ (0, 1
2)
exists with ∂Π∗
i(μ;b σ)/∂σ =0for any given μ and σ,a n di ∈ {R,S}. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
First, diﬀerentiating the ex ante expected proﬁto fﬁrm R in (4.1) with respect to






















.( A . 1 2 )







































> 0.( A . 1 3 )





























































































¶2 (2λ + V/2)V/2
λ
2 < 0.( A . 1 5 )
This completes the proof. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Firm S with information θ expects to earn the following proﬁt from sending message










Hence, using (A.3) and (A.4), the expected proﬁtd i ﬀerence between disclosure and
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22Firm S is indiﬀerent between disclosure and concealment of θ, given rival’s beliefs
consistent with μ,i fπ(θ|θ)=π(∅|θ), which reduces to: σ = s(μ;θ),w h e r e
s(μ;θ) ≡
1
2(λ + V )
µ




.( A . 1 7 )
The spillover s(μ;θ) is monotonic in μ(θ
0) for any θ,θ
0 ∈ {θ,θ},s i n c ed i ﬀerentiating


















4λ(λ + V )
.( A . 1 8 )
Further, one can show (using the regularity condition 2.1) that for any μ:
0 <s (μ;θ) <s (μ;θ) <
1
2
.( A . 1 9 )
Consequently, there does not exist an equilibrium where ﬁrm S randomizes the dis-
closure of both cost levels. Deﬁne: σL ≡ s(0,1;θ), σL ≡ s(0,0;θ), σH ≡ s(0,0;θ),
and σH ≡ s(1,0;θ).
(a) Suppose that ﬁrm R has beliefs consistent with (μ(θ),μ(θ)) = (q,1) for 0 ≤
q ≤ 1,i . e . ,P(∅)=1 .T h e n ﬁrm S has an incentive to disclose bad news, i.e.
π(θ|θ) ≥ π(∅|θ),i fσ ≤ s(q,1;θ),o rσ ≤ σL,s i n c es(q,1;θ)=σL for any q.
(b) Now suppose that ﬁrm R has beliefs consistent with (μ(θ),μ(θ)) = (0,q).T h e n
ﬁrm S has an incentive to conceal good news, if π(θ|θ) <π (∅|θ),o rσ<s (0,q;θ).
The ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between disclosing and concealing bad news, if σ = s(0,q;θ).
Inequality (A.19) implies that (0,q) is an equilibrium disclosure rule for σ = s(0,q;θ).
Deﬁne μL(σ) as the inverse of s(0,q;θ), and notice that μL is continuous and decreasing
for σL ≤ σ ≤ σL (see A.18).
(c) Firm S conceals all information in equilibrium, if π(θ|θ) <π (∅|θ) for all θ ∈ {θ,θ}
and P(∅)=p.T h eﬁrm prefers to conceal good news, if σ ≤ σH, and it prefers to
conceal bad news, if σ ≥ σL. Hence, full concealment is chosen in equilibrium for all
spillovers σL ≤ σ ≤ σH.
(d) Analogous to part (b),s u p p o s et h a tﬁrm R has beliefs consistent with (μ(θ),μ(θ)) =
(q,0) for some 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.I n t h a t c a s e π(θ|θ)=π(∅|θ) gives σ = s(q,0;θ),a n d
π(θ|θ) <π (∅|θ) gives σ>s (q,0;θ). Hence, inequality (A.19) implies that disclosure
rule (q,0) is chosen in equilibrium for σ = s(q,0;θ).D e ﬁne μH(σ) as the inverse of
s(q,0;θ) for any 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and σH ≤ σ ≤ σH, and notice that μH is continuous and
increasing (see A.18).
23(e) Analogous to part (a), suppose that ﬁrm S chooses (μ(θ),μ(θ)) = (1,q) for
0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Given consistent beliefs (i.e., P(∅)=0 ) ﬁrm S has an incentive to
disclose good news, if σ ≥ σH,s i n c es(1,q;θ)=σH for any q.
Finally, uniqueness of the disclosure equilibrium follows from the monotonicity of
μL and μH, and the non-existence of equilibria in which both types choose mixed
disclosure strategies. This completes the proof. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
For spillover values in [0,σ L], [σL,σH],a n d[σH, 1
2] the analysis of (5.1) coincides with
proposition 1, since disclosure rules are constant on these intervals (see proposition
3a ,c ,a n de ) .T h ea n a l y s i sf o r(σL,σL) and (σH,σH) follows. First, deﬁne the type
that adopts a mixed disclosure strategy on interval (σk,σk) as θk for k ∈ {L,H},i . e . :
θk ≡
½
θ,i fk = L,
θ,i fk = H.
(A.20)
Second, deﬁne the spillover level σL ≡ s(0,q;θ) for some 0 <q<1,a n ds(.) as in
(A.17), i.e., σL <σ L < σL (see proposition 3b). The equilibrium disclosure rule for
σ = σL is (μ∗(θ),μ ∗(θ)) = (0,μ L(σL)) = (0,q),s i n c eμL is the inverse of s(0,μ L;θ).
Similarly, deﬁne σH ≡ s(q,0;θ) for some 0 <q<1 (i.e., σH <σ H < σH and

























.( A . 2 2 )
T h ep r o o fp r o c e e d sb ye v a l u a t i n gt h es i g n so f( A . 2 2 )f o rk ∈ {L,H} and i ∈ {R,S}.
(a) The analysis of (5.1) for i = S gives immediately that both terms are positive
(negative) if σ = σL (resp. σ = σH)f o ra n yq ∈ (0,1).



























2.( A . 2 3 )
24Second, evaluating (A.11) at σ = σk, and using the deﬁnition σk = s(μ∗(σk);θk),w i t h


























since E(θ)−θk =[ 1− E{μ∗(θ)}][E{θ|∅} − θk] if σ = σk for k ∈ {L,H}. Substitution

























V/2(λ + V/2)2h(λ,q). (A.25)
where
h(λ,q) ≡ 2[1− Pr(θk)q]
¡







.( A . 2 6 )












respectively. Moreover, h(λ,q) in (A.26) is monotonic in q,a n dt h e r e f o r ei tc h a n g e s
sign at most once on the interval (σk,σk) for k ∈ {L,H}. Hence, one local maximum
i sr e a c h e do nt h ei n t e r v a l[σk,σk] for k ∈ {L,H}. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
This proof is similar to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Therefore, I only report the






















1 − b X(σ)
´
< 0. (A.27)













































0 ∈ {θ,θ}. This completes the proof. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
This proof is similar to the proof of proposition 4. The existence of the ﬁrst local max-
imum at σ =0 , and the absence of further local maxima on the interval (0,σ L]∪(σL, 1
2]
follows immediately from monotonicity of I∗(μ∗(σ);σ) on the interval, as implied by
propositions 3 and 5, and (5.3). First, I show that there exists at most one local
maximum on the remaining interval (σL,σL].A si nt h ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 ,t a k e





















(λ + V/2)2 ·
p(θ − θ)λ(λ + V )
V/2















with P(∅)=p/[1−q(1−p)]. Clearly, dI∗(μ∗(σL);σL)/dσ is increasing in q,s i n c et h e
ﬁrst term is constant in q, and the second term is increasing in q.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
I∗(μ∗(σ);σ) is concave in σ for σ ∈ (σL,σL],s i n c eσL is decreasing in q.C o n c a v i t y
implies in turn that a local maximum on the interval is unique, if it exists.
S e c o n d ,i f( A . 2 9 )i sp o s i t i v ef o ra n yf e a s i b l eσL (or q), then a local maximum exists







p(θ − θ)λ(λ + V )
V/2
−





(λ + V/2)2 ·
F(λ)
(λ + V )V/2
26with
F(λ) ≡ p(θ − θ)λ(λ + V )
2 − (λ + V/2)(λ + E(θ))(V/2)
2
Clearly, F is convex and increasing in λ for suﬃciently high values of λ. Therefore,
t h e r ee x i s t sac r i t i c a lv a l u ef o rλ beyond which F is positive. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
Suppose the statement is not true. In other words, suppose there is an equilibrium
in which ﬁrm S sends informative messages, e.g. m ∈ {L,H} and w.l.o.g. E{θ|L} <
E{θ|H}. The expected proﬁto fﬁrm S with information θ for sending message m is
π(m|θ) as deﬁned in (A.16). Similar steps as in the proof of proposition 3 give:
π(L|θ) − π(H|θ)=
[E(θ|H) − E(θ|L)]V/2
(λ + V/2)2 ·
·
∙
2σ(λ + V ) −
µ








2(λ + V )
µ









(H,H),i fσ ≤ so(θ)
(H,L),i fso(θ) ≤ σ ≤ so(θ)
(L,L),i fσ ≥ so(θ)
This message strategy is always inconsistent with ﬁrm R’s beliefs, i.e. the assumption
E{θ|L} <E {θ|H}. This contradiction completes the proof. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8



























2 − 2λV/2 − (V/2)2
λ
2 ,( A . 3 0 )
w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e( n e g a t i v e )i ﬀ λ>λ
∗ (resp. λ<λ
∗), as stated in the proposition. ¤
27P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9





















2 − 2λV/2 − (V/2)2
λ
2 .( A . 3 1 )


















(λ + V )
¡
λ











λV/2(λ + V/2)2H(λ,q),( A . 3 2 )
with
H(λ,q) ≡ [1 − Pr(θk)q]λ(λ + V/2)
¡
λ
2 − λV/2 − 4(V/2)
2¢
− (V/2)
4 .( A . 3 3 )
Clearly, λ
2 −λV/2−4(V/2)






∗. Consequently, if λ ≤ λ
0,t h e nH(λ,q) < 0 for any q.I f λ>λ
0,t h e n
H(λ,q) is decreasing in q, and increasing in λ.D e ﬁne λ
∗∗ such that H(λ
∗∗,0) = 0,i . e . ,
λ
∗∗ >λ
0.F i r s t ,i fλ
0 <λ<λ
∗∗,t h e nH(λ,0) < 0,a n dt h e r e f o r eH(λ,q) < 0 for any
q, i.e., equilibrium industry proﬁts are single-peaked, as in Proposition 4 (a). Second,
if λ>λ











i(μ∗(σ);σ)/dσ > 0.M o r e o v e r ,d
P
i Π∗
i(μ∗(σ);σ)/dσ changes sign at most
once on the interval (σk,σk) for k ∈ {L,H},s i n c eH is monotonic in q. Hence, one
local maximum is reached on the interval [σk,σk] for k ∈ {L,H} as in Proposition 4
(b). ¤
28B Supplementary Appendix
Here I prove Propositions 10 and 11, which are related to the maximization of proﬁts
and innovation probability, respectively.
Proposition 10 The critical cost parameter λ
∗∗∗ exists, with λ
∗∗∗ >λ
∗∗,s u c ht h a tf o r
all λ ≥ λ
∗∗∗ neither ﬁrm R’s expected equilibrium proﬁt nor the expected equilibrium
industry proﬁt reach a global maximum in σ = b σ, i.e., the spillovers σ0 and σ00 exist
such that Π∗
R(μ∗(σ0);σ0) > Π∗


















b X(b σ)+b σV
¶
b X(b σ),( B . 1 )
since x∗
R(∅)= b X(σ) for μ = 0. Second, evaluate ﬁrm R’s expected equilibrium proﬁt
at spillover value e σ ∈ {σL,σH}, i.e., μ∗(e σ) ∈ {(0,1),(1,0)} implying full disclosure in



















(1 − e σ)V − E(θ) − [θ − E(θ)]
λ + V/2
¶2)

















b X(b σ)+b σV −
1
2
(λ + V )

















b X(b σ)+b σV
¶
b X(b σ) −
1
2
(λ + V )
µ










b X(b σ)+b σV −
1
2
(λ + V ) b X(b σ)
¶





∗(b σ);b σ) −
1
2
(λ + V )
µ




λ · Va r(θ)
2(λ + V/2)2,( B . 2 )
since λ
2 b X(b σ)+b σV = 1
2 (V − E(θ)),a n d b X(b σ)=( V − E(θ))/(λ+V ),a sf o l l o w sf r o m
(3.4) and (3.8). Recall that: σL = s(0,1;θ) and σH = s(1,0;θ),w i t hs(μ;θ),a si n
29(A.17). The spillover σL can be rewritten as follows (using deﬁnition 3.8):
σL = s(0,1;θ)=
1
2(λ + V )
µ






2(λ + V )
µ





= b σ −
p2λ + V/2
4λ(λ + V )
(θ − θ).
Similarly, σH = s(1,0;θ)=b σ +[ ( 1− p)2λ + V/2](θ − θ)/[4λ(λ + V )].M o r e o v e r ,
Va r(θ)=p(1 − p)(θ − θ)2. Hence, Π∗
R(μ∗(e σ);e σ) in (B.2) can be written as follows









2(λ + V/2)2g(λ;P(θ)),( B . 3 )
with




2(λ + V )
,( B . 4 )
and θ = θ if e σ = σL, while θ = θ if e σ = σH. Clearly, the function g is increasing and
unbounded in λ for any given P,w i t h0 <P<1. Hence, there exists a critical cost
parameter b λ1 such that g(λ;P) > 0 for all λ>b λ1.
(b) First, for μ∗ and σ = b σ the expected equilibrium proﬁto fﬁrm S in (4.2) equals




























































λ · Va r(θ)
2λ
2 .( B . 5 )
Second, evaluating ﬁrm S’s expected equilibrium proﬁta ts p i l l o v e rl e v e le σ ∈ {σL,σH},
i.e., full disclosure in equilibrium (using x∗
S(θ;θ)=x∗
R(θ), as follows from A.2, and
Lemma 1 d) yields immediately: Π∗
S(μ∗(e σ);e σ)=Π∗
R(μ∗(e σ);e σ). Combining this ob-






∗(e σ);e σ)=2 Π
∗
R(μ




























G(λ;P) ≡ P(1 − P)λ
λ
2 − 2λV/2 − (V/2)2
λ
2 −
[P2λ + V/2]2V 2
16λ
2(λ + V )
,( B . 6 )
and θ = θ if e σ = σL, while θ = θ if e σ = σH.A s i n p a r t ( a ) , f u n c t i o n G is clearly
increasing and unbounded in λ for all λ>λ
∗. Hence, there exists a critical cost
parameter b λ2 > 0 such that G(λ;P) > 0 for all λ>b λ2. Proposition 9 implies that
b λ2 >λ
∗∗. Finally, deﬁne λ
∗∗∗ ≡ max{b λ1,b λ2}, and the proof is complete. ¤
Proposition 11 The expected probability of innovation in equilibrium, I∗(μ∗(σ);σ),
reaches the unique global maximum for σ =0 .
Proof: The existence of the ﬁrst local maximum at σ =0 , and the absence of further
local maxima on the interval (0,σ L]∪(σL, 1
2] follows immediately from monotonicity of
I∗(μ∗(σ);σ) on the interval, as implied by propositions 3 and 5, and (5.3). Therefore,
it suﬃces to show that I∗(1;0)>I ∗(0;σL),w i t hσL ≡ s(0,1;θ) and s as in (A.17),
to establish the global maximum can only be reached for σ =0 . It is straightforward
to show that:
I
∗(1;0) = b X(0)
³


























with Va r(θ)=p(1−p)(θ −θ)2.S i n c eI∗(0;σ) is quadratic in σ,i ti se a s yt oﬁnd the







1 − b X(0)
´2
+ Va r(θ) − (λ + V/2)
³
1 − b X(0)
´!
31It is easy to verify that σ0 is concave in p, and is maximized for p = p0,w i t h :
p0 ≡
4λ − 2V +3 θ + θ
4
¡
2λ − V + θ + θ
¢





2λ − V + θ + θ
¢
Using this upper bound and regularity condition (2.1) yields the following inequalities:
σL − σ0 ≥
1
2(λ + V )
µ




















4V (2λ − V/2+θ)
≥
1












2 − 10λV + V 2¤
V/2
16λ(λ + V )(2λ − V/2)
> 0
Monotonicity of I∗(0;σ) in σ (i.e. ∂I∗(0;σ)/∂σ < 0 as Proposition 5 shows) yields im-
mediately: I∗(1;0)=I∗(0;σ0) >I ∗(0;σL) ≥ I∗(0;σ) for any σ ∈ [σL,σL].M o r e o v e r ,
monotonicity of I∗(μ;σ) in μ(θ) (i.e. ∂I∗(μ;σ)/∂μ(θ) < 0 as proposition 5 shows)
implies that I∗(0;σ) ≥ I∗(0,μ L(σ);σ)=I∗(μ∗(σ);σ) for any σ ∈ [σL,σL]. ¤
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